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1 Introduction
After the extensive progress of auction theory in the last decades, it is a common view
that private sales under incomplete information are in most cases strategically equiv-
alent to a standard auction format, while the specific format has no bearing on the
expected revenue under certain conditions as is shown by the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem. Standard auction models, however, do not allow for any further interaction
among bidders once the auction is over. Typically, in such models, auctions with sym-
metric bidders are efficient: the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction; see
Janssen and Karamychev (2009), Janssen and Moldovanu (2004), and Myerson (1981).1
Furthermore, auction theory assumes binding rules of the auction although manipula-
tion of rules is frequently observed (e.g., shill bidding in Internet auctions, accepting
subsequent offers after an auction closes in corporate acquisitions, or re-auctioning un-
sold items in real-estate sales).2 If ex-ante commitment to an allocation rule is not
ex-post credible, the bidders anticipate some ex-post modification of the auction and
adjust their bids accordingly. In such a case, the seller (or the buyer if it is a reverse
auction)3 mostly bears the cost, since the auction generates smaller rents; see Hoppe
et al. (2006), Janssen and Karamychev (2010), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006).
Consequently, the auction literature has investigated the role of binding rules and
further interactions among bidders separately. However, both are important in the
context of firm acquisitions, and therefore we investigate commitment to auction rules
and post-auction interactions at the same time. In particular, we consider a private
(foreign) firm that wants to acquire one out of two target firms with private costs.4
The two firms quote acquisition prices in a (reverse) takeover auction, and compete by
1Procurement environments with incomplete information may generate different results. Focusing on
procurement and modeling information asymmetries on the quality dimension, for example, Manelli
and Vincent (1995) show that standard auction mechanisms are often inefficient, especially due to
the adverse selection aspect of procurement environments. See, also, Klemperer (1999; 2004) and
Krishna (2002) for reviews of the literature on auction theory.
2For more details and some anecdotal evidence, see McAdams and Schwarz (2006; 2007), Vartiainen
(2013), and Skreta (2015).
3In reverse auctions (procurement auctions, subcontracting, etc.) a buyer asks potential sellers to
quote prices for a particular contract.
4Mergers and acquisitions have been the driving force of international integration and have increased
substantially, especially in the post-deregulation era of the 1990s (e.g., see Andrade et al., 2001).
According to UNCTAD (2014), close to 35% of all global foreign direct investment took place as
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (valued at US$349bn in 2013). Also Boone and Mulherin
(2007) show that auctions were employed in half of the takeovers of major U.S. firms in the 1990s.
However, not all mergers and acquisitions are successful (see e.g., Gugler et al., 2003), indicating
asymmetric information.
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quantities after the auction.5 The outcome of the auction may generate information
externalities as the firms update their beliefs about their private cost information. In
this framework, we show that there is no mechanism that allows the investor to acquire
the low-cost firm. She is able to acquire the high-cost firm in a (separating equilibrium)
reverse auction, but this has the cost of adverse selection. A second-price auction does
not allow the acquired firm to appropriate a share of potential gains from acquisition,
and thus earns the investor a higher expected payoff than a first-price auction. However,
commitment to select the high-cost firm is crucial and may jeopardize both separating
takeover procedures. The scope of a reverse auction that separates different types is
very small without commitment due to the investor’s potential opportunistic behavior
in post-auction interactions. Alternatively, the investor can run a takeover auction in
which she expects all target firms to quote the same price in a pooling equilibrium.6
Our novel result is that a pooling takeover auction serves as a commitment device
against ex-post opportunistic behavior, alleviates adverse selection, and can earn the
investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction. This result holds not only
for a pooling takeover auction that qualifies for a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
but also when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.
Our paper is mostly related to the following strands of the recent auction literature: (i)
commitment in auctions, (ii) auctions with post-auction interactions, and (iii) auctions
with externalities. Commitment issues in auctions have been scrutinized recently by
several papers. McAdams and Schwarz (2007), for example, formally introduce the lack
of commitment, such that the seller, after having observed the bids, cannot commit not
to ask for another round of bids. Vartiainen (2013) allows for both the seller and the
bidders not to commit to the auction rules, and he assumes that all actions are publicly
observable. Skreta (2015) discusses an auction in which the seller can re-auction the
good if it has not been sold. The seller in her model discounts the future, and thus the
lack of commitment is costly for the seller. In these studies, an auction mechanism is
followed by another auction-like mechanism, and the commitment problem arises when
the good does not sell in the first round (or when there is scope for increasing rents by
prolonging the auction). In our study, the lack of commitment, which may invalidate
5See Pagnozzi and Rosato (2016) for an alternative analysis of takeover auctions in which an entrant
and some incumbent firms, first, compete in an auction to acquire a target firm, then compete by
quantities on the product market. They also compare the takeover auction mechanism with bilateral
negotiations. Their model, however, does not look at commitment to auction rules, nor does it consider
asymmetric information.
6Throughout the paper, we refer to an auction with a separating equilibrium as a separating auction,
and we refer to an auction with a pooling equilibrium as a pooling auction.
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the auction, is due to existence of post-auction oligopolistic competition that does not
depend on the outcome of the auction.
We can also relate our study to the literature on auctions with resale (or rather, auctions
followed by some post-auction interactions), although commitment to the auction rules
has not been an issue in this strand of the literature. Studies on auctions with resale
tend to focus on asymmetries among bidders resulting in inefficient allocations, and
argue that there may be a motive for post-auction resale insofar as the outcome of
the auction is potentially inefficient; see, among others, Gupta and Lebrun (1999),
Haile (2003), and Hafalir and Krishna (2008; 2009). This literature finds that post-
auction resale (via ex-post bargaining) may generate efficiency, even though fear of
revealing private information in the auction stage renders the allocation inefficient. In
such auctions, existence of a monotonic equilibrium warrants that the losing bid (or
valuations) should not be made public.7 In our study, however, disclosure of bids is
inconsequential and the inefficient mechanism that separates different types is not the
reason for post-auction interactions, but rather a result of post-auction oligopolistic
competition.
In our study, there are both downstream interactions and informational and allocative
interdependencies as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), relating our study to the litera-
ture on auctions with externalities. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) focus on downstream
externalities: they employ a second-price sealed-bid auction and model both the sale of
a cost-reducing innovation to firms (which leads to negative externalities) and a merger
between two out of three firms competing in the same industry (which leads to posi-
tive externalities). They show the existence of a separating equilibrium in the presence
of negative externalities, and no separating equilibrium but pooling equilibria in the
presence of positive externalities. In their model, only firms bidding in the auction are
exposed to externalities, and, although the information structure is incomplete ex ante
(at the auction stage), there is complete information ex post (at the product-market
competition stage). In our study, however, all agents are exposed to information exter-
nalities and depend on characteristics that are not observable. More importantly, we
relax their assumption that all private information is revealed after the auction, and
we focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept.
We allow for the possibility that the prices quoted in the takeover auction may serve
as signals that influence beliefs on the intensity of competition in the product market.
7See Krishna (2002, chapter 4) for a discussion on the impossibility of efficiency in a first-price auction
with resale when all bids are made public.
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This approach is similar to Goeree (2003) and, more recently, to Ding et al. (2013).
Goeree (2003) considers an auction setup in which bidders with incomplete informa-
tion compete for a cost-reducing patent. All bidders, the winner and the losers, then
compete in an aftermarket. He shows that bidders signal their private information via
the winning bid, and this puts an upward bias on the equilibrium bidding strategies.
In a different model, Ding et al. (2013) employ a similar signaling approach and com-
pare different takeover auction mechanisms (e.g., first-price vs. second-price, cash vs.
profit-sharing auction) in the presence of aftermarket Cournot competition. Another
study that includes aftermarket competition in the analysis is one by Janssen and
Karamychev (2010). They focus on auctioning of multiple licenses and on the winning
firms that compete in the aftermarket. They show that the auction mechanism does
not always choose the most cost-efficient firms. Our main contribution, relative to the
articles mentioned above, is that we look at the scope for (credible) commitment to
the rules of the auction in the presence of downstream interactions and information
externalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Cournot duopoly
model under incomplete information, shows that no mechanism that allows an investor
to acquire the low-cost firm exists, and introduces two commitment conditions that are
crucial for the separating (reverse) auctions. Section 3 solves the model for a symmetric,
fully-separating equilibrium in strictly decreasing bidding strategies for a first-price
and a second-price takeover auction and discusses their revenue implications as well as
their reliance on the commitment conditions. Section 4 develops two different pooling
takeover auctions and compares the investor’s expected payoffs with those in separating
takeover auctions. Finally, Section 5 concludes. For convenience, we have relegated most
of the proofs and technical details to the Appendix.
2 The model
In what follows, we consider a game that has five stages as outlined by Table 1. There
are two firms whose production costs are private information (see stage 1) and one
investor who designs an auction for firm acquisition (stage 2), which is followed by
acquisition prices quoted by the potential target firms (stage 3) and then by an ac-
quisition decision made by the investor based on the quoted prices (stage 4).8 In the
8We set up the model such that the investor is not allowed to acquire both firms. The reason is that
local competition authorities would not permit the foreign firm to gain monopoly power.
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last stage, the market is served by two firms. Consumers in this market have quasi-
linear preferences such that the inverse demand function is given by p = a− (qi + qj),
i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}, where p denotes the equilibrium price, and qi and qj are the
respective outputs of the two firms producing homogeneous goods. Both firms draw
their marginal production cost (independently) from the uniform distribution F (c) = c;
hence, the marginal costs are distributed over the support [0, 1].9
Table 1: Game structure
Stage I:
Nature selects the marginal cost ci ∈ [0, 1] of both target firms.
Each target firm privately learns its marginal cost ci.
Stage II:
The investor announces an auction design
that specifies an allocation rule and a transfer scheme.
Stage III:
Each target firm quotes a unilaterally binding acquisition price.
Stage IV:
The investor accepts one price or rejects both prices.
If the investor accepts one price, she enters the market by firm acquisition,
but the non-acquired firm does not learn the winning acquisition price.
If the investor rejects both prices, she stays out of the market.
Stage V:
Firms that are in the market compete by quantities.
Without any acquisition, the two firms would compete in a Cournot duopoly and would
produce at the level maximizing their expected profits Πi = (a − qi − Ei (qj) − ci)qi,
i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}, where Ei (qj) is firm i’s expectation of firm j’s output. Firms
do not know each other’s marginal production cost, but they can correctly anticipate
each other’s optimal behavior. We can derive the optimal outputs as a function of
firm-specific marginal production costs and expected costs:
qi =
2a− Ej(ci) + 2Ei(cj)− 3ci
6
, i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}. (1)
We will assume throughout the paper that a > 2 which guarantees that outputs are
positive even if Ej(ci) = ci = 1 and Ei(cj) = 0, i 6= j. In equation (1), ci is firm i’s
9We shall note that the assumption that the marginal costs are distributed independently is important
for our results. This assumption implies that there is no correlation among cost signals. In the case
of auctions with correlated private signals, the literature has shown that it would be possible to find
efficient mechanisms in which the seller could extract all the surplus; see Crémer and McLean (1985;
1988).
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realized marginal production cost, and Ei(cj) is firm i’s expectation of firm j’s marginal
production cost. Firms update their beliefs on each other’s marginal production cost
with any relevant information that is revealed before they make their output decisions.
Without acquisition and if no further information is revealed until the two firms make




2a− Ej(ci) + 2Ei(cj)− 3ci
6
)2
, i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}. (2)
Equation (2) shows that a firm’s expected profit is positively related to its expectation
of its rival’s cost, and is negatively related to the rival firm’s expectation of its own
cost. Any information that reveals, before the firms make their output decisions, that
firm j is a low-cost firm leads firm i to update its beliefs, such that Ei(cj) becomes
smaller, and hence decreases firm i’s expected profits and increases firm j’s expected
profits, ceteris paribus.
The acquiring firm is an investor who considers the acquisition of one of the two target
firms to enter the market. This investor holds some intangible assets that allow her,
and only her, to realize efficiency gains from a full acquisition. Note carefully that we
have a technology leader in mind who will never want to share its knowledge capital
beyond firm boundaries. Thus, the investor is interested only in a full acquisition. This
rules out any form of partial acquisition or joint venture or licensing arrangement in
which a third party would gain access to the investor’s knowledge capital.10
The investor may realize two different forms of acquisition benefits: (i) access to tech-
nologies, management skills, intangible assets etc., and (ii) combining its own (comple-
mentary) assets with those of the acquired firm for competition in the acquired firm’s
market. The first benefit is fixed and independent of the cost realization of the acquired
firm, whereas the second benefit depends on the acquired firm’s cost realization. If the
investor acquires a firm, the acquired firm’s marginal cost will decline to γci, i = {1, 2},
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is an (exogenously given) inverse measure of the cost-saving effect of
the acquisition and is common knowledge.11 We can consider γ as the investor’s con-
tribution to the ex-post productivity of the acquired firm: combining complementary
assets of the investor and the acquired firm generates efficiency gains. Therefore, γ = 0
implies that the investor’s assets are substantially efficient, dominating the acquired
10For the role of partial ownership as a potential screening device, see Stähler (2014).
11Colucci et al (2015) develop a model where the buyer’s valuation of a seller’s input is private infor-
mation of the buyer, and they discuss the incentives of the buyer whether to reveal this information.
In their model, each seller knows all sellers’ costs, while costs are private information in our model.
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firm’s assets: the investor successfully carries over her technology to the acquired firm.
Similarly, γ = 1 implies that the acquisition of a firm generates no efficiency gains:12
the acquired firm’s technology is used.
Let vi(ci, cj), i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}, denote the investor’s aggregate operating profit
after having acquired a target firm of cost-type ci and competing against a firm of type
cj. The superscript i represents the firm that is acquired by the investor. The investor’s
ex-post aggregate payoff (excluding the cost of acquisition) consists of the fixed benefit
Γ and the operating profit vi(ci, cj), and is equal to
Γ + vi(ci, cj) where vi(ci, cj) =
(




Since we are not interested in the role of the investor’s participation constraint in this
paper, we assume that the fixed benefit Γ is sufficiently large and makes any firm ac-
quisition worthwhile. This fixed benefit could also be adjusted by the inclusion of other
entry options (e.g., greenfield investment). Our results would remain qualitatively the
same, if the investor had to choose simultaneously between the acquisition of a local
firm and greenfield investment.13 Empirical evidence suggests that such decisions are
indeed made simultaneously, especially given a long lead time that greenfield invest-
ments generally require; see, for example, Raff et al. (2012).
Which type of firm should be targeted by the investor? Suppose that the investor learns
the cost types such that ci < cj, i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}. From an ex-post perspective,
it is obvious from equation (3) that
vi(ci, cj)− vj(ci, cj) =
(









12Efficiency gains play an important role in the profitability of mergers and acquisitions: firms may
benefit from a merger, provided sufficient efficiency gains are generated as in Perry and Porter (1985).
These efficiency gains cannot be realized by a simple technology transfer, but only by an integration
of the acquired firm into the acquirer’s firm boundaries. Since the combination of assets is key for
cost savings, the investor will not able to sell or auction off any technology to one or both firms.
Without efficiency gains, firms may not benefit from a merger if they compete in a market of strategic
substitutes in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985) due to the merger paradox ; see, for example, Salant et
al. (1983), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Convex demand (Hennessy, 2000), product differentiation
(Lommerud and Sorgard, 1997) and competition in a market of strategic complements (Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985) can overcome the merger paradox. The merger paradox does not apply here as
the investor stays out of the market and earns zero profit if no acquisition takes place.
13Scrutinizing the optimal entry mode when different options for foreign market entry are available is
beyond the scope of this study; see Koska (2016) for a model that employs an ascending takeover
auction in the case of complete information, and a second-price, sealed-bid, takeover auction in the
case of incomplete information, and that looks at an investor’s choice between firm acquisition and
greenfield investment.
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for any ci < cj, i 6= j and i, j = {1, 2}. That is, the investor’s ex-post aggregate
payoff (excluding the cost of acquisition) as given by equation (3) is greater with the
acquisition of the low-cost firm than with that of the high-cost firm. In any auction
that implies a certain acquisition price, if the investor were free to acquire any target
firm for the same acquisition price, then she would always opt for the low-cost firm.
The assumption of identical acquisition prices (and thus the selection of the target
firm based on the ex-post aggregate payoff), however, is not reasonable under complete
information, and it may happen that the investor will want to acquire the high-cost firm.
The reason is simple: although the ex-post aggregate payoff is greater when the investor
acquires the low-cost firm, it is also more expensive to do so, as the low-cost firm is more
profitable and thus has a better outside option. In the case of complete information,
the investor could acquire the firm that would earn her ex post the highest net payoff
(i.e., the net value to the investor after the acquisition price is subtracted from equation
(3)). In the case of incomplete cost information, however, the investor will not know the
types of firms ex ante. That said, committing to a certain allocation rule in an auction
would be warranted. We will see later that this may lead to serious complications if
ex-ante commitment to select a certain type is not possible. Not surprisingly, we also
find a clear ex-ante preference of the investor (in terms of the ex-post aggregate payoffs)
under asymmetric information, but we have to conclude that this is not a viable option,
either.
Proposition 1 The investor’s expected operating profit of acquiring the low-cost firm
and competing against the high-cost firm is larger than the expected operating profit of
acquiring the high-cost firm and competing against the low-cost firm. However, there is
no implementable mechanism that allows the investor to select the low-cost firm under
asymmetric information.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The reason is that the compensation for a low-cost firm should increase with its high
productivity, but this allows the high-cost firm to mimic the low-cost firm without any
cost. Proposition 1 shows that any separating equilibrium must imply that the investor
acquires the high-cost firm, and consequently, the best a separating auction setup can
achieve is to target the high-cost firm.
We will now scrutinize the scope of separating and pooling auctions, both to be ex-
plained in detail in the subsequent sections. In any separating auction, if it is a feasible
design, bidders will truthfully reveal their type, and the scope of separating auctions
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will crucially depend on
Condition 1 (Allocation rule) If the investor decides to acquire a firm, she will
commit to acquire the firm quoting the lowest acquisition price.
In a pooling auction, both prices will coincide so Condition 1 is immaterial in this type
of auctions, as the investor does not learn the type and will select each target with
equal ex-ante probability. If Condition 1 holds, and the auction setup is such that the
winner receives his quoted price (that is, if it is a first-price reverse auction), no further
commitment is necessary. However, if the winner receives the (higher) price quoted by
the loser, we will also need
Condition 2 (Transfer scheme in a second-price reverse auction) If the investor
decides to acquire a firm, she will commit to compensate the firm quoting a lower price
by the higher acquisition price quoted by the other firm.
It should be clear that Condition 2 is subordinate to Condition 1, meaning that Con-
dition 2 cannot be met without Condition 1. The investor cannot credibly commit to
a transfer scheme which implies a second-price reverse auction when she is not able to
commit to select the lower bid. Therefore, it is already obvious that any second-price
reverse auction will require more commitment than a first-price reverse auction.
3 The scope of separating auctions
In this section, we consider two different sealed-bid auction formats, the first-price
reverse auction and the second-price reverse auction. Both auction setups, if feasible,
lead to cost revelation, and the "quality of a match" is determined by the size of
the ex-post marginal cost and is the potential target firms’ private information.14 The
acquisition prices quoted in the auction determine the investor’s market entry cost,
and are not disclosed after the auction.15
We start with the first-price reverse auction in which, after acquisition prices have
been quoted, the investor acquires one of the two target firms. In the last stage, the
14Formally, we consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We do not consider a potential repetition of
an auction as in Skreta (2015). A well-known complication in these setups is the ratchet effect; see
Freixas et al. (1985), and Laffont and Tirole (1988).
15Our results would not change qualitatively if bids were (honestly) disclosed. However, we find this
setup more compelling, also because the investor would always claim that the winning firm was just
as productive as the losing firm unless she could credibly commit to reveal the bids truthfully.
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investor and the non-acquired firm update their beliefs on each other’s productivity,
and compete in a Cournot duopoly. Suppose that Condition 1 holds, and let φi denote
firm i’s quoted price that is monotonic and strictly increasing in firm i’s productivity
(i.e., strictly decreasing in its marginal production cost), an assumption that we have
to confirm later. The higher is the firm’s marginal cost, the smaller is the quoted price.
We find:
Proposition 2 If Condition 1 is fulfilled, the first-price reverse auction has a symmet-
ric, fully-separating equilibrium in strictly decreasing bidding strategies. In equilibrium,
firm i quotes
φ∗ (ci, γ) ≡ φ∗ (ci, γ = 0) + γ∆ (ci, γ) , where (5)
φ∗ (ci, γ = 0) =
(




∆ (ci, γ) =
(




Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The following remarks are in order. Provided Condition 1 is fulfilled, it is individually
rational for both firms to quote prices that are a function of their private information
(marginal costs). The profit-maximizing strategy is thus to quote a price that signals
true productivity. Therefore, the outcome of the auction reveals valuable information
that will affect future interactions on the product market.
Proposition 2 shows that in a larger market (a is bigger), firms quote higher prices in
equilibrium, as they expect a higher profit: it will be, ceteris paribus, more costly to
enter a larger market by acquiring a firm. By the same token, for any given market size
a > 2 and cost-saving effect γ ∈ [0, 1], it will be more costly to acquire a lower-cost
firm, such that ∂φ∗i (ci, γ) /∂ci < 0: if it competes against the investor, a lower marginal
production cost secures a larger market share and thus a higher profit in expected
terms. Moreover, the quoted prices increase with a decreasing cost-saving effect, such
that ∂φ∗i (ci, γ) /∂γ > 0 for all a > 2 and ci, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Firms quote relatively low prices,
φ∗i (ci, γ = 0), when their market share will be small when competing against a strong
investor (that is, when γ = 0). As the cost-saving effect gets smaller (such that γ 6= 0
increases), firms anticipate that the acquired firm will produce with a larger marginal
cost, which leads them to expect a larger market share and larger expected profits
when competing against the investor. Therefore, they quote higher prices, φ∗i (ci, γ > 0)
(see equation (5), given by Proposition 2), such that they compensate for the increase
in their outside profits.
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Given equation (5), we are now able to compute the investor’s ex-ante expected payoff.
Let c(1) and c(2) denote the signals that are rearranged in ascending order: c(1) is the
lowest-cost signal, and c(2) is the highest-cost signal, such that c(1) < c(2). Given the
uniform distribution F (c) = c, we can write the highest-order statistics, denoted by
F1(c), such that F1(c) = F (c)2 = c2. The investor’s ex-ante expected profit from a first-





















64a(2− 5γ) + γ(181γ − 72)− 16
864
+ Γ, (6)
where v(2)(c(1), c(2)), derived from equation (3), denotes the investor’s operating profit
after having acquired the high-cost firm, and φ∗(c(2)) is derived from equation (5).
Note carefully that the variable gains from the acquisition of a firm can be negative:
the auction includes the possibility to acquire a lemon and to compete against a strong
(high-productivity) rival.
We now show that a lack of commitment may jeopardize the whole acquisition process
as the takeover procedure via such a separating auction is prone to ex-post opportunis-
tic behavior exploiting information externalities. Without commitment (Condition 1),
the investor may find it profitable ex post to acquire the low-cost firm, as we could
already see from equation (4). This incentive depends on the market size, the size of the
ex-post marginal production cost, and on the difference in quoted acquisition prices.
We will show that the investor will want to continue to acquire the high-cost firm only
in a sufficiently large market, especially when there is sufficiently large cost-saving.
Suppose that both target firms continue to believe that the high-cost firm will be
selected, but the investor were free to select any firm for acquisition, and she would
pick firm i. Let V i(ci, cj) denote the investor’s ex-post profit after having acquired firm
i and when competing against firm j:
V i(ci, cj) =
(
2a− γ(1 + cj)/2 + 2cj − 3γci
6
)2
− φ∗(ci) + Γ; i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. (7)
The first expression of the RHS is derived from equation (3) and represents the in-
vestor’s operating profit after having acquired firm i, where γ(1 + cj)/2 corresponds
to Ej(ci) in equation (3): this is the non-acquired firm’s ex-post expectation of the
acquired firm’s marginal cost. The investor’s market entry cost, which is equivalent to
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the acquired firm’s quoted price, φ∗(ci), is given by equation (5) (Proposition 2), and
Γ is the fixed benefit. The investor, after having received the quoted prices, correctly
anticipates the rival’s (the non-acquired firm’s) realized marginal production cost from
bidding behavior: cj in equation (7) corresponds to Ei(cj) in equation (3). In contrast,
the non-acquired firm j, learning only that the other firm has been acquired, updates
its belief about the size of the ex-post marginal cost such that it believes to be the
low-cost firm and consequently Ej(ci) = γ(1 + cj)/2. It is clear from equations (5) and
(7) that (i) higher cost-saving (lower γ) leads not only to higher operating profits, but
also smaller market entry costs; (ii) the impact of cost-saving on the investor’s profit
is accentuated in a larger market; and (iii) acquiring a high-cost firm – larger ci in
equation (7) – increases the size of the ex-post marginal cost (and so decreases the
investor’s operating profits), while decreasing the investor’s market entry costs. We are
now ready to scrutinize the role of Condition 1. We define:
Definition 1 A reverse takeover auction is self-enforcing, if it is optimal ex post for
the investor to select the firm that quotes the lower acquisition price, given that both
firms follow the bidding strategy, given by Proposition 2.
A separating first-price takeover auction will be self-enforcing only if the investor’s
profit V i(ci, cj), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, given by equation (7), in the case of acquiring the
firm quoting a lower price is larger than the profit she could have earned by acquiring
the other firm. So, when does a separating first-price takeover auction work without
Condition 1? We find:
Proposition 3 For any given market size a > 2 and firms’ cost draws ci, cj ∈ [0, 1], i,
j = {1, 2}, and for the threshold of cost-saving, denoted by γ̃ ' 0.32:
1. If γ ≥ γ̃, the separating takeover auction is never self-enforcing.
2. If γ < γ̃,
(a) the separating takeover auction can be self-enforcing only for some values of
ci, cj if a < 10 and/or γ is sufficiently large;
(b) the separating takeover auction is self-enforcing for all ci, cj ∈ [0, 1] if a > 10
and γ is sufficiently small.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the investor will always want to select the high-cost
firm if and only if cost-saving is substantial (γ is sufficiently small) and the market is
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sufficiently large. The intuition is as follows. If cost-saving is sufficiently large, the size
of the ex-post marginal cost (γci) will be sufficiently low (even after having acquired
the high-cost firm). A sufficiently low ex-post marginal cost guarantees the investor
a large market share and a small one for the non-acquired firm so that the investor’s
market entry cost is reduced significantly. In a sufficiently large market, these effects
are accentuated, such that the decrease in market entry costs dominates the market
share effect. If, however, the market is sufficiently small, such that a < 10, the target
firms will anticipate that the investor’s incentive to reduce the rival’s market share
dominates her incentive to decrease the market entry cost, irrespective of cost-saving.
Thus, Proposition 3 suggests that both a sufficiently large market and sufficiently
high cost-saving are necessary in order to ensure the firms that a separating first-price
takeover auction can be run without Condition 1.
We illustrate these results in Figure 1, which shows the set of parameter values of
market size (a) and cost-saving (γ < γ̃) for which the investor’s commitment (i) is
not self-enforcing for any given ci, cj ∈ [0, 1] in Region I, (ii) may or may not be self-
enforcing for a given ci and cj in Region II, or (iii) is self-enforcing for any given ci,
cj ∈ [0, 1] in Region III. Region III is the only region in Figure 1 where the target
firms can be sure that the investor will have no incentive to select the low-cost firm
without binding commitment. In this region, both the market size is sufficiently large
and cost-saving is sufficiently high. In Regions I and II, the target firms anticipate
that a separating takeover auction is not self-enforcing. In Region II, for example, the
investor wants to acquire the lower-cost firm (which quotes a higher price) if the average





is sufficiently large (for details, see Appendix A.4). Although a separating takeover
auction can be self-enforcing if C is sufficiently small, the firms do not know the average
industry marginal cost at the time of the auction. If the target firms anticipate that
there is a conflict between the investor’s ex-ante commitment to a particular allocation
mechanism and her objective of maximizing ex-post profits after having seen the quoted
prices, they will no longer follow the bidding strategy, given by Proposition 2. An
optimal response for all types of firms is, then, to quote the highest price that the
lowest-cost firm would have quoted, making their bidding behavior inconsistent with the
beliefs of the investor. Consequently, the takeover procedure is no longer strategically
equivalent to a first-price reverse auction and does not lead to symmetric and fully-
separating equilibrium in strictly decreasing bidding strategies. In such a situation, a
separating equilibrium cannot exist without Condition 1.
We next consider the other class of sealed-bid auctions, a second-price (separating)
14
Figure 1: The scope of self-enforcing auctions
takeover auction, in which the winner who quotes the lower acquisition price gets the
higher acquisition price quoted by the other firm. Since the quoted prices are not
disclosed, this setup obviously warrants additional commitment given by Condition 2:
the investor must be able to commit to truthfully compensating the winner by the
(higher) acquisition price quoted by the loser. If this commitment fails, we will be back
to the setup that we have already scrutinized above. The reason is simple. The investor
would have an incentive to claim that the rival’s price was just a small ε > 0 above
the price quoted by the winner so as to decrease the cost of acquisition and increase
her profits as much as possible. Since Condition 2 is subordinate to Condition 1, the
alternative setup is feasible only if both conditions hold and we may confine the analysis
to the payoff implications for the investor: would the investor do better in a different
separating auction if she could commit credibly to both the allocation rule and the
transfer scheme? Suppose that both Condition 1 and Condition 2 hold and let φs∗
denote the quoted prices in equilibrium where the superscript s denotes the second-
price (reverse) takeover auction. It is straightforward to show that each firm has a
weakly dominant strategy of quoting its own valuation of acquisition, which is the
minimum payoff that yields a nonnegative surplus.16 That is, in our context, each
16See, for example, Krishna (2002) for a sketch of the general proof.
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target firm will quote the expected profit of competing against the investor such that
φs∗i =
(




Equation (8) is derived from equation (2), where Ej(ci) – the investor’s expectation
of the marginal production cost of firm i – is replaced by ci, because the investor,
having observed the quoted prices, can correctly anticipate the realization of the firms’
marginal production costs. Firm i, by contrast, will only know that the investor acquires
the rival firm because the rival’s marginal cost is higher, enabling the rival to quote
a lower price. Therefore, Ei(cj) in equation (2) - firm i’s expectation of the acquired
firm’s marginal cost - is replaced by γ(1 + ci)/2.
Following equation (6), we can compute the investor’s ex-ante expected payoff from a


























64a(1− 2γ) + 47γ2 − 16
288
+ Γ, (9)
where φs∗ is given by equation (8), and v(2)(c(1), c(2)), derived from equation (3), is the
investor’s operating profit after having acquired the high-cost firm and c(1) and c(2) are
the cost signals where c(1) < c(2). We find:
Proposition 4 A second-price reverse takeover auction yields a higher expected payoff
for the investor than a first-price reverse takeover auction if γ < 1. The two separating
takeover auctions are revenue equivalent when γ = 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
Why does the second-price auction do better in terms of expected investor payoffs?
Note carefully that the investor’s operating profit after having acquired the high-cost
firm is the same across the two separating takeover auctions. The main difference
is the ex-ante expected cost of acquisition. In the first-price auction, the optimal bids
balance the risk of not winning the auction and competing against a strong rival against
winning the auction and getting a share of the productivity gains. Hence, the first-price
auction allows the winning target firm to appropriate a share of the potential gains,
but the second-price auction does not. Firms bid their outside options and the winner
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gets the loser’s outside option. Therefore, the second-price auction allows the investor
to appropriate all productivity gains. Given this background, it is not surprising that
revenue equivalence holds only if there are no productivity gains, that is, if γ = 1.
4 The scope of pooling auctions
An alternative auction setup is given if the investor expects both firms to quote the same
acquisition price, irrespective of their cost-types. In order to scrutinize this possibility,
we have to be more explicit about the investor’s belief structure. In standard auctions,
the belief structure does not play a critical role: bidders reveal their types, but this
is inconsequential. In the previous sections, however, the belief structure has been
consequential: the quoted prices in the takeover auction and the takeover itself convey
information, and the firms update their beliefs about their future rival. Furthermore,
the investor may want to accept the higher acquisition price, making the separating
auction setup vulnerable to ex-post opportunistic behavior.
If, however, an equilibrium exists in the pooling auction, then the investor, in equi-
librium, will not be able to update her beliefs but will continue to use her priors to
evaluate the expected outcomes as all types will quote the same acquisition price.
While there is no room for a pooling equilibrium in standard auctions, we show that
it plays an important role in our setup. In this sense, a pooling auction setup serves
as a commitment device to avoid ex-post opportunistic behavior.17 A delicate issue in
pooling equilibria is the specification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that will support the
equilibrium. In this section, we will consider two concepts, the weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (weak PBE) concept and the sequential equilibrium (SE) concept.
We start with the weak PBE for which we assume that the investor is able to convince
both target firms that she will believe that any firm not quoting the (common) acqui-
sition price she has in mind will be thought of being the highest-cost firm. The idea
is that the investor sets up an auction and, prior to running it, communicates to the
target firms which offer she will expect and accept, and that any firm deviating from
this will be considered as the highest-cost firm.
In particular, assume that a pooling equilibrium exists in which both firms quote an
17A pooling auction is strategically equivalent to a game in which an investor (i) can make simultaneous
take-it-or-leave-it offers to both firms and (ii) has a certain belief structure on types depending on
their unilateral acceptance. This should not be confused with take-it-or-leave-it acquisition offers to
target firms that are desinged to separate types (see Koska and Stähler, 2014).
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acquisition price Φ∗. The investor forms beliefs as follows: (i) if any firm quotes Φ∗,
the investor believes that this firm’s marginal production cost is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1; (ii) if any firm quotes an acquisition price Φ 6= Φ∗, the investor
believes that this firm has the highest marginal cost of 1. Let the investor’s beliefs
on the expected cost of firm i as a function of firm i’s bid Φi be denoted by µi(Φi),





and µi(Φi 6= Φ∗) = 1. (10)
If a pooling equilibrium exists, the investor’s expected profit from firm acquisition via
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− Φ∗ + Γ. (11)
Both target firms quote the same price Φ∗. Therefore, the investor randomizes when
selecting one of the target firms, which look identical to her. Each target firm’s expected












Any weak PBE supported by this belief structure has to fulfill the condition that no
firm has an incentive to quote a different acquisition price. If any firm quotes a higher
price than Φ∗, the investor will never select this firm, but will update her beliefs, such
that after the acquisition of the other firm, she will have received the good news that
the rival has the highest cost. This specifies a lower bound for the acquisition price:
if Φ∗ is too low, a target firm might find it more profitable not to quote it and lose
the auction even if this leads the investor to believe that the firm has the highest cost.
If, however, any firm quotes a lower acquisition price than Φ∗, this lower price will
be accepted by the investor only if it undercuts Φ∗ substantially: the investor believes
that the defecting firm is of highest cost-type, which increases the expected operating
profit from the acquisition of the rival firm and decreases the operating profit from the
acquisition of the defecting firm. This defection option puts an upper bound on Φ∗: if
Φ∗ is very large, it is relatively costless to undercut the candidate pooling acquisition
price. Appendix A.6 has the details of the defection options and proves that
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Proposition 5 Weak PBEs exist: the investor forms beliefs according to equation (10),















(2a− 1 + γ)2
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Proof: See Appendix A.6.
Proposition 5 demonstrates a range of weak PBEs. Of course, the best one for the
investor would be to convince both firms that she believes that both firms quote the
lowest bid. Substituting Φ∗ = Φ into equation (11) gives the investor’s maximum
expected payoff in the weak PBE pooling auction:










(8a(5− 6γ) + (1 + 3γ)(5γ − 3)) + Γ. (13)
How does the outcome of the pooling auction compare to that of the separating auction?
We find:
Proposition 6 The best weak PBE has a higher expected payoff for the investor than
both separating (auction) equilibria.
Proof: See Appendix A.7.
This is a strong result. We find that the investor can always do better with a weak PBE
pooling auction. On the one hand, this auction allows her to commit not to exploit
information revealed during the auction. On the other hand, any separating takeover
auction can only be run such that the investor will select the high-cost firm, but the
pooling auction alleviates adverse selection. With a pooling auction in which the target
firms are expected to quote identical acquisition prices, the investor will have a chance
to acquire the more profitable (low-cost) target firm. Proposition 6 also shows that
there is even no revenue equivalence when γ = 0, that is, when the investor will be
able to produce with the least (zero) costs.
Why are revenues in the weak PBE auction strictly larger? In any separating auction,
adverse selection decreases the investor’s expected payoff because (i) it leads to a
smaller decrease in marginal costs, and (ii) it implies that the rival will be a tough one.
When γ = 0, the first effect disappears, but the second effect is still there. We can show
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that the (best) weak PBE implies an acquisition price that is always smaller than the
price for the highest-cost firm in a first-price auction. Employing a separating auction
and thus paying more for firm acquisition enables the investor to learn the future rival’s
cost, but the news can be good or bad. On average, the learning gain is smaller than the
learning cost even if this learning cost, that is, the difference between the first-price
auction acquisition price and the (best) weak PBE price, is smallest for c = 1 and
γ = 0. The key for understanding revenue dominance of the (best) weak PBE is the
logic of the two bounds and the associated belief structure. The lower bound is derived
such that the candidate equilibrium bid should not be too low that the least-cost firm
is better off by quoting a higher price and by being treated as the highest-cost firm.
Similarly, the upper bound is derived such that the candidate equilibrium bid should
not be too high that the highest-cost firm undercuts the bid successfully so as to be
picked despite being regarded as the highest-cost firm. The difference between the upper
bound and the lower bound is strictly positive, even for γ = 0, because underbidding
leads the investor to believe that the firm is of the highest-cost and the expected profit
of acquiring the other firm increases.
While the belief structure in equation (10) supports a weak PBE, it will not allow any
firm to deviate marginally from the predicted strategy. We now consider the scope of a
sequential equilibrium (SE) in the sense of Kreps and Wilson (1982) in this setup. The
SE warrants that the equilibrium strategy is consistent such that it can be represented
as the limit of a sequence of purely mixed strategies and beliefs where the beliefs are
formed according to Bayes’ Rule. The weak PBE does not qualify for an SE as it has
a knife-edge property and cannot accommodate any sequence of strategies and beliefs
converging to the equilibrium. The belief structure in a pooling auction that is an SE
is given by
µi(Φi ≥ Φ̂) =
1
2
and µi(Φi < Φ̂) = 1, (14)
that is, for any quoted price Φi ≥ Φ̂, the investor believes that marginal production
costs are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, whereas if a firm quotes Φi < Φ̂, then
the investor believes that the firm has the highest marginal cost (c = 1). We find:
Proposition 7 A sufficiently small cost-saving, that is, γ ≥ 1/3, guarantees that a
sequential equilibrium exists: the investor forms beliefs according to equation (14) and
each target firm quotes the same acquisition price Φ̂ = (2a − 1/2 + γ)2/36, where
Φ < Φ̂ < Φ.
Proof: See Appendix A.8.
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An SE always exists for any γ when the market is sufficiently small (a ∈ [2, 4.5]). If,
however, γ is small and a is large, then an SE does not exist: underbidding in such a
case is profitable even if it implies that the firm will be considered as the highest-cost
firm. The reason is that the target’s cost is less important for a low γ, especially as
compared to market size a. Φ̂ must be larger than the lower bound of the weak PBE so
as to make the least-cost firm participate. If Φ̂ were smaller, the least-cost firm would
be better off by quoting a higher price: it would not be selected, but due to the belief
structure (14), the investor would not change its belief about this firm. The common
bid Φ̂ just makes the least-cost firm indifferent and all other types strictly prefer to
quote Φ̂.
This indifference leads to the interesting observation that the SE bid is equal to a take-
it-or-leave-it-offer of an investor who wants to maximize the acceptance probability of
her offer. Suppose that the target firms could accept an offer unilaterally, meaning that
they would sell for the offered acquisition price if they were selected by the investor.
If an investor does not run an auction but can commit to non-negotiable offers to
both firms, an offer of size Φ̂ would be accepted by both firms of all types. Thus, the
expected revenue given by the SE coincides with the investor’s best take-it-or-leave-it
offer that makes unilateral acceptance by both firms certain. Since Φ < Φ̂ the best
weak PBE will always do better than the SE for the investor. What about the revenue
implications compared to the separating auctions? We find:
Proposition 8 Suppose that Condition 1 and Condition 2 hold and an SE exists in
the pooling auction. (i) The SE earns the investor a higher expected payoff than the
first-price auction. (ii) A sufficiently small cost-saving, that is, γ ≥ 1/2, makes the SE
earn the investor also a higher expected payoff than the second-price auction.
Proof: See Appendix A.9.
Proposition 8 shows that the SE outcome is always better for the investor than the
outcome of the first-price auction. An immediate implication is that if Condition 1 fails
to hold, and thus also the subordinate Condition 2 cannot hold, the pooling auctions
always do better. The reason is that they do not imply strict adverse selection, and
both are not restricted to a certain parameter space. Even if we require consistency,
the SE pooling auction dominates the first-price separating auction for this reason. An
interesting result is that the SE auction does not always dominate the second-price
auction. If Condition 1 and Condition 2 hold, the second-price auction may perform
better than the first-price auction because the quoted prices in the second-price auction
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are determined by the outside options only and the second-price auction does not allow
the target firms to appropriate any share of the productivity gains from the acquisition.
These outside options are lowest, and thus also the acquisition prices are lowest, the
larger is the threat of acquisition-induced productivity gains. While it is true that also Φ̂
declines with a decrease in γ, an additional effect in the second-price separating auction
is that large productivity gains make the adverse selection problem less relevant. For
large productivity gains, that is, for a small γ, the effect of small outside options driving
acquisition prices and the increasing irrelevance of the adverse selection problem may
make the second-price separating auction more attractive for the investor. The dilemma
is that it requires the strongest commitment at the same time.
5 Concluding remarks
Our paper has brought together three different strands of the recent auction literature:
(i) auctions without enforceable commitment, (ii) auctions with post-auction strategic
interactions among agents, and (iii) auctions with externalities. We have shown that
both a first-price and a second-price separating auction procedure for firm acquisition
will imply strict adverse selection. Furthermore, commitment issues along with informa-
tion and allocative externalities, due to incomplete cost information and post-auction
interaction, may make the takeover procedure via a separating sealed-bid auction not
work. However, a pooling auction qualifying for a weak PBE works; serves as a commit-
ment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior; alleviates adverse selection; and
even earns the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating takeover procedure
if it implies the lowest common bid. If we require consistency, the pooling auction
qualifying for a sequential equilibrium is always better than the first-price separating
equilibrium. Moreover, there is a threshold level of cost-saving, above which (for suffi-
ciently small cost-saving) a sequential equilibrium is also better than the second-price
separating equilibrium.
Our results have shed some light on the potential limitations of (reverse) auctions with
post-auction interactions. Separating takeover auctions require a substantial degree of
commitment in case of downstream information externalities, and if they are run by
the investors themselves, opportunistic behavior is hard to avoid.18 Only if the investor
outsources the auction activity credibly to an independent party with no own agenda,
18This commitment problem is similar to the one mentioned in Spulber (1990), in which he points out
that the bidding behavior and the efficiency of auctions is determined by the contractual commitment
in procurement auctions.
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target firms may develop trust in the allocation and transfer rules. We have also shown
that pooling auctions, even with consistency requirements, can do better and can avoid
opportunistic behavior. In general, our results have shown that price competition by
an auction may be limited under incomplete information and information externalities.
Interestingly, the pooling sequential equilibrium secures the investor the same expected
revenue as an offer of the investor to the target firms that will make both firms accept
the offer unilaterally. This observation shows that changing roles such that the investor
becomes the bidder may be a better strategy than running an auction.
We have used the example of a specific reverse auction with linear demands and a
uniform cost distribution to demonstrate the limitations and the scope of auctions and
their revenue implications. It should be clear that our main results should generalize
to any setting in which post-auction activities depend on information revealed during
an auction and any separating auction will imply adverse selection. In this case, any
separating auction will face the problem that good types could be preferred to be
selected ex post over bad types. Thus, any auction that potentially changes downstream
interaction may be vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior. Examples beyond firm
acquisition could include selecting a joint venture or R&D partner, and competition
for an exclusive patent. We leave these extensions to future research.
Appendix
A.1 The investor’s net payoff under complete information
Suppose that the cost types are public information such that ci < cj, i 6= j. The net
value of firm acquisition to the investor is the difference between the aggregate payoff
given by equation (3) and the acquisition price. Suppose that the investor has the full
bargaining power and can acquire any firm by paying the firm its outside profits. Would
the investor acquire the low-cost or the high-cost firm? Comparing the investor’s net
gain when she acquires the low-cost firm to that when she acquires the high-cost firm
shows that[(


















for any ci < cj, i 6= j, so long as the parameter values are such that the inequality
(cj − ci)(1 − γ)(2a − 5(1 + γ)(ci + cj))/9 ≤ 0 holds. That is, the investor gains more
by acquiring the low-cost firm than the high-cost firm so long as market size (a) is
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sufficiently small, or when there is no cost saving (i.e., when γ = 1, in which case the
investor will be indifferent).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
c(1) and c(2) are the signals that are rearranged in ascending order: c(1) < c(2). If the
design is given, such that the investor acquires the low-cost firm and competes against
the high-cost firm, then the investor’s ex-ante expected operating profit from acquiring


























96a2 + 128a(1− γ) + 57γ2 − 96γ + 48
)
,
where v(1)(c(1), c(2)) is derived from equation (3), and denotes the investor’s operating
profit after having acquired the low-cost firm. F2(c) is the lowest-order statistics, and
given the uniform distribution F (c) = c, we can show that F2(c) = 2F (c) − F (c)2 =
c(2 − c). If, however, the design is given, such that the investor acquires the high-
cost firm and competes against the low-cost firm, then the investor’s ex-ante expected


























96a2 + 64a(1− 4γ) + γ(185γ − 96) + 16
)
,
where v(2)(c(1), c(2)) is derived from equation (3), and denotes the investor’s operating
profit after having acquired the high-cost firm. F1(c) = F (c)2 = c2 is the highest-order
statistics. We are now ready to show that
v̂(1)(c(1), c(2))− v̂(2)(c(1), c(2)) =
1
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(2γ + 1)(2a− 2γ + 1) > 0,
which proves the first part of Proposition 1. In the second part of Proposition 1, it is
noted that, as to realize v̂(1)(c(1), c(2)), no implementable design that leads to truthful
revelation exists. We do the proof by contradiction: we assume that there is a design in
which the investor learns the types. In such a design, for all possible cost realizations,
the low-cost firm is selected and the other firm learns - by not being selected - that the
acquired firm has a lower cost. If such a design exists, using the Revelation Principle,
we can confine the analysis to a design in which each target firm will send the investor
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a cost signal that should reveal, in equilibrium, the firm’s realized (true) cost. In an
implementable design, each target firm truthfully reports its cost-type to the investor.
Suppose that a target firm of type c sends cost signal c̃ to the investor. The target
firm’s expected profit is then given by
c̃
(




where the expression in brackets, derived from equation (2), is the firm’s profit when
it competes against the lower-cost (acquired) firm, and T (c̃) is the transfer from the
investor to the target firm signaling type c̃, given the other firm reports the true type.
If the target firm sends cost signal c̃, the probability of being a higher-cost firm (that
is, the probability of the other firm being a lower-cost firm) is exactly equal to c̃:
with probability c̃, the firm will not be selected and will realize the profit of a firm
competing against a lower-cost firm. At the same time, the firm that is not selected
learns that the selected firm has a lower cost than c̃, so the expected ex-post marginal
cost of the selected firm - which corresponds to Ei(cj) in equation (2) - is equal to
c̃γ/2. Consider now any two different types c′, c′′ ∈ [0, 1]. If a design exists, it must be
incentive compatible, such that neither type has an incentive to mimic the other type:
IC ′ = c′
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Adding up these two inequalities should also be positive, although the result suggests
− 1
12
(c′ − c′′)2(4a− (5− 2γ)(c′ + c′′))
which is definitely negative for sufficiently low cost realizations (and/or for a suffi-
ciently large a). Consequently, any implementable design in which the target firms will
truthfully report their cost-types and the low-cost firm will be selected for acquisition
will not exist, proving the second part of Proposition 1. Note that Appendix A.3 shows
that a mechanism (designed as an auction) will exist if the investor can commit to
select the high-cost firm. In that case, the transfer, denoted by T in this section, is
equivalent to the expected profit when the firm is selected for acquisition, that is, the
probability of being selected times the quoted acquisition price.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof consists of two parts: (i) incentive compatibility and (ii) individual rationality
and the development of the optimal bids. As for incentive compatibility, consider two
different types - as defined by private (marginal cost) information - c′, c′′ ∈ [0, 1]. A
separating takeover auction must be incentive compatible, such that neither type has
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an incentive to mimic the other type:
IC ′ = c′φ′ + (1− c′)
(
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Adding up the two inequalities, given by equations (A.1) and (A.2), leads to
IC ′ + IC ′′ =
1
12
(c′ − c′′)2(4a− (5− 2γ)(c′ + c′′) + 2),
which is clearly positive for any c′, c′′, γ ∈ [0, 1], given a > 2. Hence, the sufficient
condition for incentive compatibility is fulfilled.
We now turn to the optimal bids and individual rationality. If Condition 1 is fulfilled,
firm i will win the auction by quoting φi < φj, and will be paid φi. We denote by Ψi
the probability that firm i wins the auction (that is, the probability that φi < φj).
By the same token, the other firm wins the auction with complementary probability
(1−Ψi) (that is, the probability that φi > φj). If firm j wins the auction, firm i
will have to compete against the investor in a Cournot duopoly, and its profit follows
from equation (2), where Ej (ci) = Ψi (φi) and Ei (cj) = γ (1 + Ψi(φi)) /2. Firm i’s
probability to win the auction Ψi (φi) is determined by firm i’s productivity signal.
Provided Condition 1 is fulfilled, if the investor acquires firm j, firm i updates its belief
about firm j’s productivity such that Ei(cj) = γ
∫ 1
Ψi
(cj/(1 − Ψi))dcj = γ (1 + Ψi) /2,
since the investor would have acquired firm j only if firm j had quoted a lower price,
that is, only if firm j’s cost signal had been higher than that of firm i. By the same
token, in equilibrium, Ej(ci) = Ψi(φi), since the investor, acquiring firm j, observes the
bid of the other firm, and so can invert the bidding function. If the firms bid according
to their true productivity, then Ej(ci) = ci. Firm i’s expected profit, denoted π̂a(ci)
where superscript a stands for the auction outcome, is thus equal to
π̂a(ci) = Ψi (φi)φi + (1−Ψi (φi))
(




where Ψi (φi) coincides with the inverse of the price function. The price function φi (Ψi)
specifies firm i’s price demand, where Ψi represents firm i’s signal. Incentive compati-
bility requires φi (Ψi) ≡ φi (Ψi = ci),19
Firm i has to quote a price that maximizes the expected profit given by equation (A.3).
We simplify the notation by expressing equations without subscript i. The first-order
19In contrast to Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) and Koska (2016), we do not assume revelation of firms’
private information after the auction and before product market interactions occur.
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We assume that both firms follow the same strategy φ (c), which is strictly decreasing
in a firm’s marginal cost and has a well-defined inverse function. In equilibrium, the
inverse of a firm’s price function is equal to the firm’s marginal cost.
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≡ 0 such that φ ≡ (2a+γ)2/36+(2a+γ)/18. Note that φ is the maximum
price that the most efficient firm quotes in equilibrium. We can use equation (A.4) to
characterize the firms’ quoted prices in equilibrium. Rewriting equation (A.4) as a
differential equation,
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and, by including the boundary condition φ(0) = (2a + γ)2/36 + (2a + γ)/18, solving
for φ(c) gives the optimal price function:
φ∗ (c, γ) =








Individual rationality is guaranteed: a firm’s expected profit when it participates in the
auction, cφ∗ (c, γ) + (1 − c)(2a + (1 + c)γ − 4c)2/36, is larger than its expected profit
when it stays away from the auction, (2a− (1/2) + γ− 3c)2/36. A firm can manipulate
the post-auction market game by participating in the auction, and by pretending to be
the lowest-cost firm (c′′ = 0 or c′ = 0 in equations (A.1) and (A.2), respectively) which
of course leads to a larger expected outside profit, (2a+ γ− 3c)2/36. Even in this case,
cφ∗ (c, γ) + (1− c)(2a+ (1 + c)γ − 4c)2/36 > (2a+ γ − 3c)2/36, provided a > 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that V i(ci, cj), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, given by equation (7), denotes the investor’s
expected profit after having acquired firm i and when competing against firm j. Firms
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quote prices φ∗(ci), i ∈ {1, 2}, in equilibrium, following the price function, given by
Proposition 2. The investor’s commitment on acquiring the higher-cost firm is credible
only if the investor acquires firm i when firm i’s quoted price is less than the price
quoted by the other firm.
Let us suppose that firm i’s marginal cost is larger than that of firm j, such that
ci > cj, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, implying firm i and firm j will quote prices in equilibrium
such that φ∗(ci) < φ∗(cj), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. We need to prove that V i(ci, cj) > V j(ci, cj),
i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, that is, the investor will acquire firm i in such a situation, even without
binding commitment, which makes the auction self-enforcing. Equation (A.5) gives the
difference between V i(ci, cj) and V j(ci, cj):
V i(ci, cj)− V j(ci, cj) =
1
144
(ci − cj) (α + βC) ; i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, (A.5)
where C = ci + cj, α = 16 + 8a+ 8γ − 56aγ + 6γ2, and β = −48 + γ (32 + 31γ).
Equation (A.5) shows that V i(ci, cj) > V j(ci, cj) only if (α + βC) > 0, given ci > cj.
We can see that ∂ (α + βC) /∂C < 0 if γ < 0.831. Let us start from the case γ > 0.831,
so ∂ (α + βC) /∂C > 0. It is obvious that V i(ci, cj) − V j(ci, cj) = 0 if C = C̃, where
C̃ = −α/β. Also, it is straightforward to show that C̃ > 2 for any given a > 2,
and for γ ∈ [0.831, 1]. Therefore, for all ci ∈ [0, 1], i = {1, 2}, C < C̃, implying that
V i(ci, cj)− V j(ci, cj) < 0. The investor’s profit will be larger if she acquires the lower-
cost firm. So the investor’s commitment is not credible given that γ is sufficiently large
such that γ > 0.831. If, however, γ < 0.831, then ∂ (α + βC) /∂C < 0. In this case,
we can see that C̃ < 0 < C for all ci ∈ [0, 1] , i = {1, 2}, for any given a > 2, and for
γ ∈ [0.313, 0.831]. Consequently, the investor fails to commit credibly on acquiring the
higher-cost firm when γ ∈ [0.313, 0.831], or rather, when γ ∈ [0.313, 1].
As for γ ∈ [0, 0.313] at which ∂ (α + βC) /∂C < 0, we find that C̃ < 0 < C. The
investor fails to commit credibly on acquiring the higher-cost firm, especially for some
constellations of parameter values of a and γ (Region I in Figure 1). Similarly, we find
that C̃ > 2 > C in Region III, illustrated by Figure 1, so the auction is self-enforcing
in this region. As is illustrated by Figure 1, C̃ ∈ [0, 2] in Region II: the investor’s ex
post behavior depends on the value of C. In Region II, the investor wants to acquire
the lower-cost firm if the average industry marginal cost before the acquisition of a
firm takes place, C/2, is sufficiently large, such that C > C̃. Although a separating
takeover auction can be self-enforcing if C < C̃, the firms do not know the average
industry marginal cost at the time of the auction. Consequently, a separating takeover
auction does not work in Region II.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The difference between equations (9) and (6) is equal to
1
108
(1− γ)(8a+ 5γ − 4) ≥ 0,
for any γ ∈ [0, 1] and a > 2.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that a target firm quotes a higher acquisition price Φ′ > Φ∗. This higher
acquisition price will make sure that this target firm will not be selected. The reason
is simple. First, the acquisition price is higher; and second, the investor believes now
that it will face a weak rival after having acquired the other firm. The expected profit
of the target firm quoting Φ′, denoted π̂p′(ci), and that of the target firm quoting Φ∗,
denoted π̂p(ci) and given by equation (12), are compared in equation (A.6):
π̂p′(ci) =
(










2a− 1/2 + γ − 3ci
6
)2
⇔ Φ∗ ≥ (2a− 1 + γ − 3ci)
2
18




where the inequalities are the condition that this defection option is not be profitable.
This defection option should not be profitable for any cost-type. To determine the
relevant condition, we define
Λ(ci) ≡
(2a− 1 + γ − 3ci)2
18




where dΛ/dci = −(4a − 6c + 2γ − 3)/12 and d2Λ/dc2i = 1/2, showing that Λ(ci) is
convex in ci. Thus, the maximum of Λ is either Λ(0) or Λ(1). We can show that
Λ(0)− Λ(1) = 1
6
(2a+ γ − 3) > 0,
because a > 2. Thus, we find that the condition given by equation (A.6) holds for all
cost-types if it is satisfied for the most productive firm, ci = 0:
Φ∗ ≥ (2a− 1 + γ)
2
18




Now suppose that the target firm quotes a lower acquisition price Φ′′ < Φ∗. The
investor has the option to accept this lower offer, but at the same time she updates her
beliefs, such that she assumes that this is now a target firm with the highest marginal
production cost, which is equal to 1. A remark on the rival firm is in order when this
lower bid is accepted by the investor. Since bids are not revealed, the firm that is not
selected by the investor will not be able to learn whether or not the winning bid was
a deviation; therefore it will continue to assume that the firm that is selected by the
investor has an expected cost realization of 1/2, which leads to the expected ex-post
marginal cost of the acquired firm γ/2. Therefore, the investor’s expected payoff from
accepting the lower offer, denoted V̂ p′′(Φ′′), is equal to
V̂ p′′(Φ′′) =
(
2a− 7γ/2 + 1
6
)2
− Φ′′ + Γ,
which we can compare with her expected payoff from rejecting Φ′′ (in which case she





2a− γ/2 + 2− 3γc
6
)2






− Φ∗ + Γ.
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A lower offer makes sense only if it will be accepted by the investor. Otherwise, the
target firm loses, not only because the lower offer is declined, but also it will be consid-
ered as the highest-cost firm by the investor. The investor will accept the lower offer
Φ′′ if V̂ p′′(Φ′′) > V̂ p′′(Φ∗) which is the case when












At the same time, Φ′′ must be large enough to make the defecting firm better off such
that Φ′′ > π̂p(ci), where π̂p(ci) is given by equation (12). Thus, we conclude that no
target firm of any cost-type has an incentive to quote a lower acquisition price if































(2a− 7/2 + γ)2
36
. (A.8)
Note that π̂p(ci), given by equation (12), increases with a decrease in ci. Therefore, if
the acquisition price that would be accepted by the investor (Φ′′) is too small even for
the least productive target firm, such that π̂p(ci = 1) > Φ′′, then it is not profitable
for any firm to deviate. In summary, we can use the two conditions that are given by
equations (A.7) and (A.8), respectively, to show that a pooling equilibrium exists if
these two conditions










(2a− 7/2 + γ)2
36
≡ Φ,
Φ∗ ≥ (2a− 1 + γ)
2
18




hold at the same time, where Φ−Φ = (2γ(4a− 5γ − 2) + 11)/24 > 0 for any γ ∈ [0, 1]
and a > 2. This completes the proof that pooling equilibria exist, such that each target
firm quotes the same acquisition price Φ∗ ∈ [Φ,Φ].
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
The difference between equations (13) and (9) is equal to
1
288
(16a+ 10 + γ(32a− 8− 17γ)) > 0,
for any γ ∈ [0, 1] and a > 2.
This shows that the best weak PBE earns the investor a higher expected payoff than the
second-price separating auction, and since the second-price separating auction earns the
investor a higher expected payoff than the first-price separating auction (see Proposition
4), our proof is complete.
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Any SE must allow for a range of bids in which the belief structure is consistent. The
upper bound Φ results from the same line of reasoning as in the case of a weak PBE: it
should not be more profitable for any firm to be regarded as a high-cost firm successfully
underbidding the candidate equilibrium bid such that the investor would prefer this
bid. This puts an upper bound on the bid as in the weak PBE. However, this is only
a bound for the belief structure in the SE, and the equilibrium bid is unique, belongs
also to the set of equilibrium bids of the weak PBE, but is larger than the lowest bid
supported by a weak PBE. The reason is competition in the range in which the belief
structure is given by the priors.
Suppose that both firms bid Φ̃ where Φ̂ < Φ̃. The investor will immediately accept
a marginally lower bid by any of the two firms because it does not change its belief
structure and she can get a target firm for a cheaper price. The immediate implication
is that bids work in a Bertrand manner in this range so that an equilibrium must imply
Φi = Φ̂. At the same time, however, it should also not be profitable to quote a higher
price in this range. A firm doing so will not change the belief structure of the investor,
and while this firm will not be selected, it may be better off if the stand-alone profit
is larger than the expected profit of competing against the rival for a partnership with
the investor. Thus, the lower bound is now determined by the condition that π̂p(ci)
(see equation (12)) should not be smaller than the stand-alone profit under unrevised
investor beliefs, that is (2a− 1/2 + γ − 3ci)2/36. It is then straightforward to see that
this constraint is fulfilled if it is met by the least-cost type ci = 0, leading to Φ̂ as the
equilibrium bid.
Along with consistency of beliefs discussed above, an SE requires that a sequence of
purely mixed strategies exists such that the limit of this sequence is the SE.20 Consider
the following purely mixed strategies of each firm: choose Φ̂ with probability σn =
1− (1/n) and Φi with probability 1− σn = (1/n) where Φ̂ < Φi and n ∈ N.










The (constant) sequence of beliefs is consistent with the belief structure: as long as all
bids are in the relevant range, the investor will stick to her priors.
A sufficient condition for Φ̂ < Φ is γ ≥ 1/3 which guarantees existence of an SE
because limn→∞(σn, µn) = (1, 1/2): a sequence exists that converges to the candidate
equilibrium, and since the strategies are optimal given beliefs and the beliefs are derived
from Bayes’ Rule for the optimal strategies, our proof for the SE is complete.
20Note carefully that the equilibrium is not perfect as it does not imply Nash behavior at all nodes
off the equilibrium path. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is also a sequential equilibrium and vice
versa if either player has at most two types or the sequence of the game is limited to two stages
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), but our model does not meet any of these two conditions.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 8
Replacing Φ∗ in equation (11) with Φ̂, given by Proposition 7, yields the investor’s
expected profit from firm acquisition via an SE pooling auction such that
1
48
(1 + a(8− 16γ) + γ(5γ − 4)) + Γ. (A.9)




16a(2γ + 1)− 91γ2 + 34
)
> 0,
for any γ ∈ [0, 1] and a > 2, which proves the first part of Proposition 8.
The difference between equations (A.9) and (9) is equal to
1
288
(16a(2γ − 1)− γ(17γ + 24) + 22),
which is clearly positive for any γ ∈ [1/2, 1] and a > 2, which proves the second part
of Proposition 8. As is clear from the equation above, γ ≥ 1/2 is only a sufficient
condition for payoff dominance of the SE. In particular, we can solve for the threshold
γ (as a function of a > 2) at which the equation above is equal to zero, and hence
above which the SE earns the investor a higher expected payoff than the second-price
separating auction.
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